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[L. A. No. 22313.

In Bank. July 7, 1953.J

LEONARD F. HERZOG et ai., Respondents, v. PAUL J.
GROSSO et at. Appellants.
[1] Easements-Obstructions-Fences and Gates.-ln action to
quiet title to easement for road purposes over defendants' land,
a judgment declaring that defendants have no right to maintain fence and gates at .iuncture of road with highway and
ordering their removal is proper where plaintiffs' home is
located in a large city "nd the road should be kept unobstructed for adequate access by the fire department, police
department and other public agencies, and where defendants
could be adequately protected by putting up signs to prevent
motorists from mistaking road for a public road.
[2] Id.-Maintenance-Guardrails.-Owners of an easement for
road purposes have a right to construct and maintain a guardrail along boundary of road adjoining a steep embankment,
since guardrails are reasonably necessary to enjoyment of
easement and would not unduly burden the servient tenement.

[1] Right to maintain gates or bars across right of way, note,
73 A.L.R. 778. See, also, Cal.Jur., Easements, § 8; Am.Jur., Easements, §§ 120-124.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Easements, § 38; [2, 10, 11] Easements, § 37; [3J Nuisances, § 62; Trespass, § 26; [4J Damages, § 22;
[5] Damages, § 171; [6, 8, 9] Appeal and Error, §1431; [7]
Damages, § 106.
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[3J Nuisancea--Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Once a cause of
action for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of
land may recover damages for annoyance and discomfoIt that
would naturally ensue therefrom.
[4] Damagea--Mental Sufi'ering.-Owners of easement for road
purposes lL.ay properly be awarded damages for suffering
caused by fear for safety of their daughter and visitors as a
natural cousequence of acts of owner of servient tenement in
increasing grade of road, dumping large quantities of dirt on
road, and otherwise making road dangerous for use.
[5J ld.-Burden of Proof.,-Where owners of easement for road
purposes establish their damages by showing depreciation in
value of their property resulting from acts of owners of servient tenement in increasing grade of road, it is then incumbent on the latter to come forward with proof that the cost
of restoration would be less than the depreciation in value.
[6] Appeal- Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent
Judgments.-Rule that an appellate court will not permit a
trial court to reach diametrically opposite conclusions on
similar evidence as to the same occurrence is inapplicable when
the two decisions may be reconciled.
[7] Damagea--Excessive Damagea--Depreciation in Value of Propetty.-An award of $7,000 for depreciation in value of property
resulting from increased grade of road on adjoining property
is not excessive as a matter of law where there is no evidence
showing the cost of restoring the road to its original condition.
[8J Appeal- Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent
Judgments.-If an injunctiol.l. requiring defendant to make
alterations on a road applies to an encroachment for which
a money judgment is awarded, the trial court in effect made
conflicting findings, in which event reversal would be necessary
unless the evidence establishes as a matter of law that injury
to plaintiffs' property was or was not permanent.
[9] ld.-Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent Judgments.-Where compliance with an injunction requiring defendant to alter a roa,} to conform to a map will do nothing
more than remove a hump in the first part of the road and
will not change the steep slope on the remainder of the road,
on which an award of damages is based, the mandatory injunction and the award of damages apply to separate results
of defendant's conduct, and there is no inconsistency in granting the injunction and awarding damages.

[4] Right to recover for mental pain and anguish alone, apart
from other damages, notes, 23 A.L.R. 361; 44 A.L.R. 428; 56 A.L.E.
657. See, also, Cal.Jur., Damages, § 34; Am.Jur., Damases, § 175 at
seq.
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[10] Easements-Maintenance-Repairs.-It was error to order
the owner of the servient tenement to pave part of the road
after altering it to conform to a map attached to the decree
where the owners of the easement had previously had a dirt
surfaced road.
[11] Id.-Maintenance-Repairs.-Ordinarily the owner of a servient tenement is under no duty to maintain and repair the
easement.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Modified and
affirmed.
Action to quiet title to an easement and for other relief.
Judgment for plaintiffs modified and affirmed.
W. P. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Appellants.
Nathan E. Gillin and Button & Herzog for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-This action presents a controversy between
owners of a private road and easement and the owners of
the servient tenement. The following diagram, not drawn
to scale, shows the relationship of the road and easement to
the parcels of land involved.

\....

Blll1r lJ1'1ve

-

;~

jIc

tlnln rsal

Plcturea

Connor

2
...
~::'

~ !croaao

RoaiD
BarhUi

BouloV1U'4

r'
"

parcel 1
'(Heraos)

,

Hollywood FreewaT

-

)
222

)

HERZOG tI. GBOSSO

[41 C.2d

Mrs. Mildred Schneider originally owned the land bound~d
by Blair Drive, Hollywood Freeway, the Rosin property,
and the Universal Pictures property. The land is hilly with
the crest of the hill at the center. Plaintiffs Leonard and
Alma Herzog purchased parcel 1 in 1944 and built a home
thereon. At that time the only access to a public road from
parcel 1 was a road over the Rosin property to Barham
Boulevard. Since Rosin retained the right to revoke permission to use the road, plaintiffs did not buy parcel 1 until
Mrs. Schneider deeded to them parcel 2, a strip of land 25
feet wide. and granted them an easement for road and public
utility purposes over 'parcel 3, a strip of land 30 feet wide
and 155 feet long. A road was bulldozed around the hill on
parcels 2 and 3 from parcel 1 to Blair Drive. A telephone
pole was erected on parcel 3 at the point marked "x" on the
diagram, about 115 feet from Blair Drive. The road was
dirt surfaced. about 14 feet wide, and sloped downhill from
Blair Drive to plaintiffs' home. The grade was about 4.5
per cent to the telephone' pole and about 8.3 per cent for
the next 110 feet. Plaintiffs used both the Rosin road to
Barham Boulevard and the new road to Blair Drive.
Mr. and Mrs. Connor bought the property to the west of
parcels 2 and 3 in December, 1945. Defendants Paul and
Madolyn Grosso acquired parcel 3 and the hilltop property
in March, 1949. Difficulties between defendants and plaintiffs soon arose. In November, 1949, Paul Grosso regraded
the road from his property to Blair Drive. He dumped large
quantities of dirt on parcels 2 and 3 and on the Connor
property.· The regrading resulted in a fill that blocked all
passage from plaintiff's' property to Blair Drive. Plaintiffs
protested and were assured that the road would eventually
be made passablt!, but it remained blocked. In March, 1950,
defendants erected a fence at the point where parcel 3 joined
Blair Drive. The fence extended across 14 feet of the easement and was equipped with gates designed to close the
remaining 16 feet.
On September 2, 1950, plaintiffs received notice that they
could no longer use the Rosin road. Thereafter their only
access to the public streets was over parcels 2 and 3. After
further protests by plaintiffs, Grosso cut a ramp across the
fill to parcel 2. The new road ran on the west side of the
• An aetion by Mrs. Connor against the Grossos for the dumping on
the Connor property was eonsolidntC'd for trial with the present case.
(See CoatiOf' .... Gr08'o, 1100f, p. 229 [259 P.2d 435].)
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telephone pole, on the Connor property. The road was nar·
row, steep, and dangerous. In early October Herzog placed
posts and reflectors along the edge of the road to prevent
automobiles from going over the bank. Grosso removed the
posts and reflectors. In November, 1950, plaintiffs engaged
a contractor to pave parcels 2 and 3. Grosso ordered the
men to leave and when they did not do· so, dumped dirt on
the parts of the road that had been tine graded preparatory
to tinal surfacing. Several days later Grosso dug up the road
with a plow attached to a tractor. On December 20th, plain.
tiffs obtained a temporary restraining order, and thereafter
Grosso did not interfere with plaintiffs' use of the road. In
February, 1951, plaintiffs paved the road and placed it in
the condition it was in at the time of the trial, May, 1951.
During the period between September, 1950, and February,
1951, it was difficult to use the road. In rainy weather the
road was slippery, and plaintiffs were forced to leave their
car at the entrance and walk through the mud.
The road was surveyed shortly before the trial. The grade
over the fill made by Grosso was level for the first 68 feet
from Blair Drive, thence 4.3 per cent uphill to a point near
the telephone pole, thence 14.6 per cent downhill for the next
110 feet. One 40·foot part of this 110 feet had a grade of
17.2 per cent. At the telephone pole the fill was 6 feet over
the original level. An appraiser. duly qualified as an expert
witness, testified that "the steep grade immediately approach.
ing the short turn and a steep incline is snfficient cause for
an estimate of damage. This condition creates an extreme
fire hazard and safety hazard to all users. J , He stated
that the road was ., like driving into the banks of the Grand
Canyon. " The appraiser testified that in his opinion the
increase in grade had depreciated the fair market value of
the property by $8,700.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
The judgment declares plaintiffs' and defendants' respective
rights in the easement; orders defendant Paul Grosso to alter
the first 120 feet of parcel 3 to conform to a map attached
to the judgment; orders defendants to remove the fence and
gate at the entrance; and enjoins defendants from interfering
with plaintiffs' use of the easement. The judgment also
awards plaintiffs damages against defendant Paul Grosso as
follows: $7,000 to both plaintiffs for permanent depreciation
in the value of their property; $521.82 to both plaintiBs as
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compensation for miscellaneous expenditures; $2,000 to plaintiff husband and $2,000 to plaintiff wife for interference with
their comfortable use and enjoyment of their home; $1,500
to plaintiff husband and $1,500 to plaintiff wife for worry
and anxiety for the safety of themselves, their daughter, and
their guests; $2,000 to plaintiff husband and $2,000 to plaintiff wife as exemplary damages. Defendants appeal from
the judgment.
The judgment provides that defendants do not have "any
estate, right, title or interest whatsoever in and to said easement" and that defendants "are hereby forever enjoined
and restrained from asserting any claim whatsoever in and
to plaintiffs' said easement." Defendants contend that the
decree unduly restricts their rights in parcel 3, that it is the
only means of access to Blair Drive for themselves and their
employees, agents, guests, and deliverymen, and that they
have to use parcel 3 to obtain water, telephone, electricity,
gas and other public utility facilities. Other parts of the
judgment provide that defendants are the owners "in fee
simple of the thirty foot strip of land in, upon, under and
over which plaintiffs' said easement described in said parcel
3 extends"; that defendants have the right to nse parcel 3
for road purposes; and that defendants may use parcel 3
for other purposes "consistent with the employment of said
easement by plaintiffs and which does [not] unreasonably
interfere with the use of said easement by plaintiffs." It
thus appears that the judgment does not unreasonably restrain defendants from the use of parcel 3.
[1] The judgment declares that defendants have no right
to maintain the fence and gates at the juncture of the road
and Blair Drive and orders their removal forthwith. Defendants contend that the trial court erred, relying on the
rule that "the owner of the servient tenement may make any
use of the land that does not interfere unreasonably with
the easement." (Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. Co.,
17 Ca1.2d 576, 579 [110 P.2d 983, 133 A.L.R. 1186].) The
trial court found that the fence and gates interfered with
plaintiffs' free use and enjoyment of the easement. Plaintiffs'
home is located in a large city and the road should be kept
unobstructed for adequate access by the fire department,
police department, and other public agencies. (Cf. Los Angeles City Ordinance 97940, § 18.09.) The trial court did
not go beyond the evidence in this case by ordering the removal of the fence and gates. (See Smith T. Wom, 93 Cal.
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206, 214-215 [28 P. 944J.) Defendants suggest that they
should be allowed to maintain the gates and fence to prevent
motorists from mistaking the road for a public road and
entering defendants' property. Plaintiffs concede that defendants are "free to put up any sign deemed necessary as
would not unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs' use of the
easement. " It would appear that defendants could thus be
adequately protected.
[2] The judgment provides that "plaintiffs have a right
to construct and maintain a wooden guard rail on parcel
3 along the northwesterly boundary thereof, said guard rail
to be one of the general types usually used along public highways. " Defendants contend that the judgment thereby unduly burdened the servient tenement. By the grant of the
easement, however, plaintiffs acquired the right to do such
things as are reasonably necessary to their use thereof. (Ward
v. City of Monrovia, 16 Cal.2d 815, 821-822 [108 P.2d 425] ;
North Fork Water Co. v. Edwards, 121 Cal. 662, 666 [54 P.
69] ; 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 76b.) Since the road adjoins a
steep embankment, guardrails are reasonably necessary and
would not unduly burden the servient tenement.
The trial court found that ,. as a direct, natural and proximate result and consequence of the acts and conduct of the
defendant . . . each of said plaintiffs were caused further
to suffer nervousness, worry, and mental distress for the
safety of themselves and their daughter and others obliged
to use said road on account of the dangerous conditions under
which said defendant, Paul J. Grosso, forced them and their
family to use said parcels 2 and 3 in going to and from their
said home." Damages of $1,500 were awarded to each plaintiff. Defendant contends that the award cannot be sustained
insofar as it is predicated upon distress and worry for "the
safety of . . . their daughter and others." [3] Once a
cause of action for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of land may recover damages for annoyance and discomfort that would naturally ensue therefrom. (Anderson
v. Souza, 38 Ca1.2d 825. 833 [243 P.2d 497] ; Judson v. Los
Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21
Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 183]; Thompson v. Simonds,
68 Cal.App.2d 151, 162 [155 P.2d 870]; Rest., Torts,
§ 929(c), com. g.) In Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778
[214 P.2d 50], an action for damages resulting from blastQ~
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ing operations, the court sustained an award for discomfort,
fright, and shock caused by a blast that occurr~d at a time
when plaintiff was not at home. The court stated: "Plaintiff
testified that after the February 3 blast (in which a rock
destroyed a bench on the property near which one of his
daughters was standing) he could not rest or sleep because
of fear for his own security and that of his family. This is
a form of discomfort for which plaintiff under the circumstances of this case is entitled to recover, as well as for other
discomfort not challenged on appeal." (95 Cal.App.2d at
788.)
[4] Similarly, in the present case the suffering
caused by fear for the safety of the daughter and visitors
was a natural consequence of defendant's conduct and an
invasion of a protectible interest of an occupant of real property. The cases relied upon by defendant did not involve
an invasion of a protectible interest in real property and are
therefore not controlling here.
The judgment awarded plaintiffs $7,000 against defendant
Paul Grosso for the permanent depreciation in the value of
their property resulting from the increased grade of the
road. Defendant asserts that removal of about 700 cubic
yards of dirt would restore parcels 2 and 3 to their original
condition. Defendant then contends that the trial court
awarded excessive damages, on the ground that when the
cost of restoration is less than the depreciation in value, the
former is the measure of damages. (Cf. Green v. General
Petroleum 00.,205 Cal. 328, 336 [270 P. 952,60 A.L.R. 475].)
This contention cannot be sustained. [5] Plaintiffs established their damages by showing the depreciation in value.
It was then incumbent upon defendants to come forward
with proof that the cost of restoration would be less. (Perkins v. Bla1dh, 163 Cal. 782, 792-793 [127 P. 50].) They
failed to do so. Defendants point out that in the companion
case of Oonnor v. Grosso, post, p. 229 [259 P.2d 435], the
trial court found that the cost of removal of 3,184 cubic
yards of dirt from the Connor property would be $4,362.08,
and that the cost of removing 1,570% cubic yards therefrom
would be $2,563.85. [6] Defendants rely on decisions holding that an appellate court will not permit a trial court to
reach diametrically opposite conclusions upon similar evi·
dence as to the same occurrence. (Ferroni v. Pacific Finance
Oorp., 21 Cal.2d 773, 780 [135 P.2d 569] ; Southern Pac. 00.
v. Oity of Los Angeles. 5 Ca1.2d 545. 548 [55 P.2d 847].)
That rule is inapplicable when the two decisions mal be
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reconciled. (DiZlard v. McKnight, 34 Ca1.2d 209, 224-225
[209 P.2d 387, 11 A.L.R.2d 835].) In the companion case
the dirt could be removed from the side of a hill; in the present case the dirt would have to be taken from a narrow road
where equipment would have difficulty in operating. In addition to the cost of removing the dirt defendant in the present
case would have to regrade and resurface the road and provide for drainage. [7] Aside from the evidence in the
Connor case, there is no evidence in the record showing the
cost of restoring parcels 2 and 3 to their original condition.
Thus, we cannot say as a matter of law that the award of
$7,000 is excessive.
In addition to the award of $7,000 as damages for permanent depreciation of plaintiffs' property, the judgment
orders defendant Paul Grosso to "make alterations in the
road over and upon the northerly 120 feet" of the easement
•• so that same will conform to and be in accordance with the
plan shown on the aforesaid Private Street Map, plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 60." Defendant contends that the judgment
thereby allows a double recovery to plaintiffs, on the ground
that the mandatory injunction requires defendant to correct
a condition for which plaintiffs are awarded damages. (See
Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Ca1.2d 265, 269 [239 P.2d 625J.)
It is contended that· any error in the judgment may be
cured by deleting the injunction. [8] If the injunction
applies to an encroachment for which a money judgment is
awarded, the trial court in effect made conflicting findings,
first that the injury to plaintiffs' property was abatable. and
then that it was permanent. In that event, unless the evi·
dence established as a matter of law that the injury was or
was not permanent. reversal would be necessary. since "it
would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judgment by striking the damages for loss of market value on
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the injunctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tupman
v. Haberk.ern, 208 Cal. 256, 269·270 [280 P. 970].)" (Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Ca1.2d at 270.) Accordingly, the
determinative question here is whether the mandatory in.
junction applies to a condition for which plaintiffs are also
awarded damages.
[9] Before defendant Paul Grosso placed the dirt on
parcels 2 and 3, the grade of the road averaged 4.5 per cent
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downhill from Blair Drive to a point near the telephone
pole, about 115 feet from Blair Drive, and averaged about
S.3 per cent downhill over the next 110 feet. After defendant changed the slope of the road, the grade was level for
the :Brst 68 feet from Blair Drive, thence about 4.3 per cent
uphill to a point near the teleph,)De pole, and thence downhill for 110 feet at an average grade of 14.6 per cent and of
17.2 per cent for 40 of the 110 feet. The fill was 6 feet deep
at the telephone pole. From the testimony of the engineer
who prepared the, map referred to in the injunction and from
an examination of the map itself, it is clear that altering
the road to conform to the map will do nothing more than
remove the hump in the first part of the road. Compliance
with the injunction will not change the steep slope on the
remainder of parcel 2 and parcel 3. There is no inconsistency
in finding that some of the dirt dumped on plaintiffs' property may be removed and that other dirt dumped in a different place permanently depreciated the property. The award
of $7,000 damages is based on the testimony of H. V. Johnson, an appraiser. That witness based his opinion on the
steepness of the road, not upon the hump in the first part
of the road. The mandatory injunction and the .award of
damages thus apply to separate results of defendant's eonduct.
[10] Defendant Paul Grosso contends that the trial court
erred in ordering him to pave the north part of the road after
altering it to conform with the map attached to the decree. This
contention must be sustained. When defendants purchased
their property. plaintiffs had a dirt surfaced road on the
easement. [11] Ordinarily, the owner of the servient tenement is under no duty to maintain or repair the easement.
(Bean v. Stoneman, 104 Cal. 49. 56 [37 P. 777, 38 P. 39];
Rose v. Peters, 59 Cal.App.2d 833. 835 [139 P.2d 983].)
Defendant may be required to alter the north 120 feet of the
road to conform with the map. but he may not be required
to pave the road for the benefit of plaintiffs.
The judgment is modified by deleting that part of paragraph 19 reading: "and that wherein said map does not
specify the details of construction of said road said defendants shall construct said road in accordance with the require·
ments of Standard Specifications No. 151 for Public Improvement as promulgated by the Department of Public Works
of the City of Los Angeles. California, and approved by the
COUDcll of said City under date of May 15, 1951, and now
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in effect." As so modified the judgment is affirmed..
fendant Paul Grosso is to bear the costs of this appca 1.

De-

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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